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STUDENT NOTES
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-AGENT'S
IN WRITING

AUTHORITY TO BE

The Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law provides, in section 19,
as follows:
"The signature of any party may be made by a duly authorized agent. No-particular form of appointment is necessary for
this purpose, and the authority of the agent may be established
as in other cases of agency."
The General Assembly of Kentucky substantially adopted the
Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law in 1904, but changed section 19
to read:
"The signature of any party may be made by an agent duly
authorized in writing."'
It is interesting to note that Kentucky and South Dakota are the
only states which have adopted the Uniform Law that have made this
change.'
Due to the passage of the above act, which apparently changed
the common law on this point, the Court of Appeals was forced to
construe that section in the 1915 case of Finley v. Smith
In this case
the alleged maker pleaded that the note was not signed by him or his
agent duly authorized in writing. The court in deciding that a recovery could not be had, set out the difference between the proposed
Uniform Law and the statute enacted and held that the fact that the
Legislature made the change prevented any interpretation other than
that the authority must be in writing. The Court said: "It may not
have been a wise change to have made. It may in some instances
work harm and injustice in the administration of the law, but if so the
remedy is with the legislature and not the courts."
Two years later the court held that the statute applied to endorsements as well, and that a verdict should have been directed for
the defendant when it was not shown that the agent who signed had
written authority to do so.4
This section of the statute, however, must be read in connection
with Kentucky Revised Statutes section 356.023, which reads:
"When a signature is forged or made without the authority of
the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge
1
KY. R. S. 356.019.
'BRANNON, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932) p. 254.
165 Ky. 445, 177 S. W. 262 (1915).
4
Inter-Southern Life Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of
Hazard, 178 Ky. 95, 198 S. W. 563 (1917).
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therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto,
can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the
party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded
from setting up the forgery or want of authority."
The phrase, "precluded from" has been interpreted to mean
merely that the well established principles of estoppel may be applied.'
Although oral ratification alone may not be sufficient to
estop the party from pleading the statute as a bar to recovery, if the
person has agreed in writing to pay, or accepts the benefits from
the note, then the statute cannot be used to prevent a recovery on
the instrument.
These sections of the statute relate only to negotiable instruments and they should not be confused with Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 371.090, which requires an agent's authority to sign
as surety on any instrument to be in writing, since that statute relates to both negotiable and non-negotiable instruments
Having concluded that written authority is necessary in most
cases in order for an agent to sign a negotiable instrument, the
question is raised as to what amounts to written authority. In the
case of Harding v. River Hardwood Company,'0 an agent was given
power of attorney to discount certain notes at 10 percent on value.
The agent, however, discounted them at 18 percent. In a suit on
these notes the Court held that authority should be strictly construed
and that the discounting at 18 percent by the agent was of no effect.
Our Kentucky Court has held, however, that authority does not have
to be specific. In the case of Milton Electric Company v. Central
Credit Corp.," the authority was as follows:
"This will serve to introduce Miss King, who has my power
of attorney, as explained to you, and who during my absence will
sign and endorse for the company any and all trade acceptances
presented to you."
The court held that this was sufficient authority for the discounting of negotiable instruments.
Embery v. Long, 256 Ky. 266, 75 S. W. 2d 1036 (1934); Citizens'
Union National Bank v. Terrell, 244 Ky. 16, 50 S. W. 2d (1932).
'Dalton v. Skelton, 267 Ky. 40, 101 S. W. 2d 208 (1937); InterSouthern Life Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of Hazard, 178
Ky. 95, 198 S. W. 563 (1917).
'Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson's Adm'x., 25 K. L.
R. 682, 76 S. W. 335 (1903).
' Baskett v. Ohio Valley Banking and Trust Co., 214 Ky. 41, 281
S. W. 1022 (1926); Ohio Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Great Southern
Fire Insurance Co., 176 Ky. 694, 197 S. W. 399 (1917).
'Dickson's Adm'r. v. Luman, 93 Ky. 614, 20 S. W. 1038 (1894);
Dawson v. Lee, 83 Ky. 49 (1884).
*' 205 Ky. 1, 265 S. W. 429 (1924).
"234 Ky. 469, 28 S. W. 2d 507 (1930).
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An interesting question also arose in Selma Savingg Bank v.
Webster County Bank," where the cashier of the defendant bank
telephoned in a telegram accepting certain checks. The Court held
that the telegraph operator was not an agent and therefore no written authority was necessary to bind the bank. The Court said that
the act was as much his act as if he had signed in person and that the
telegraph operator was a mere instrumentality by which his signature was affixed. This doctrine of "amanuensis" is followed in many
other jurisdictions as well," and will probably be the solution to the
cases where a person directs his secretary to sign his name to a
check.
Although Kentucky Revised Statutes section 356.023 does lessen
the effect of this requirement that the agent must be authorized in
writing, it nevertheless places a tremendous burden on a transferee
of a negotiable instrument. Before he can safely accept an instrument
executed by an agent, he must know that the agent has been authorized in writing. A general power of agency or apparent authority
is not sufficient, unless, of course, the principal is estopped from
denying the agent's authority. This statute, wisely or unwisely,
certainly extends the principle that one who deals with an agent
does so at his peril.
A. E. Fu x, J.

182 Ky. 604, 206 S. W. 870 (1918).
Normand v. Brawley, 63 F. 2d 446 (1933); Pierce v. Dekle, 61
Fla. 390, 54 So. 389 (1911); Guthrie v. Gaskins, 171 Ga. 303, 155 S. E.
185 (1930); Reed v. Cedar Rapids, 138 Iowa 366, 116 N. W. 140
(1908).

